Recently, China has suspended purchases of US‑dollar‑denominated iron ore from BHP. This move has sent shockwaves through the international mineral market. On October 11, Jiang Yaodong, a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and former Vice‑President of China University of Mining and Technology‑Beijing, who has long followed China’s mining‑security issues, commented: “Superficially, this action is a proactive response to the single pricing rule and unreasonable pricing. Yet it goes far beyond ordinary trade adjustments. It can be likened to a thunderclap shattering the old order. At a deeper level, it marks a historic leap in China’s mineral‑resource security strategy from passive response to proactive planning. It also sends a strong signal that China is striving for development initiative amid the restructuring of global industrial chains in the new era.”

Jiang Yaodong is a three‑term member of the National CPPCC. His 2023 proposal On Attaching Great Importance to China’s Mineral Resource Security was honored as an Outstanding CPPCC Proposal of that year. He told journalists: “In the past, the ‘resource curse’ — ‘whatever we buy becomes expensive, whatever we sell becomes cheap’ — long constrained China’s industrial upgrading. Today, under the firm leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, as the systematic resource‑security arrangements set out in the 14th Five‑Year Plan are gradually implemented, China is taking a series of far‑sighted measures to firmly seize the initiative over resource security into its own hands.”

According to Jiang Yaodong, this campaign to break through existing constraints has quietly unfolded along three dimensions: resource guarantee, pricing game‑playing, and strategic resolve, and is fully reflected in this suspension‑of‑purchase incident.

From the perspective of resource guarantee, mineral‑resource security means more than simply “having mineral deposits available for use”. It constitutes an all‑round campaign covering exploration, reserves, recycling and technological innovation. Jiang Yaodong pointed out: “Thanks to the New‑round Strategic Action for Breakthroughs in Mineral Exploration launched under the 14th Five‑Year Plan, China has continuously expanded the scope of geological prospecting beyond traditional regions and shallow subsurface spaces. In 2023, China’s investment in solid‑mineral exploration surged by more than 15 % year‑on‑year. Multiple large‑scale lithium deposits were discovered in Qinghai, Xizang and other places, providing strong support for independent domestic resource supply. Technological innovation holds the key to breaking resource dependence. On the one hand, China keeps tackling technologies for utilizing low‑grade ores. For instance, the cut‑off grade for iron‑ore processing has dropped from roughly 30 % to about 20 %. In 2024, national scrap‑steel recovery reached approximately 250 million tons, accounting for over 50 % of global scrap‑steel output. Both developments further reduce import reliance on primary ores. On the other hand, R&D for material substitution is being accelerated. In new‑energy‑vehicle and high‑end‑equipment‑manufacturing sectors, rare‑earth permanent‑magnet motors are replacing traditional iron‑core motors. This not only curbs demand for high‑grade imported iron ore but also fosters new industrial competitiveness. By exerting efforts on both the supply and demand sides, China is easing excessive dependence on imported mineral resources.”

In terms of pricing games, Jiang Yaodong believes that the key to overcoming the predicament of “buying dear and selling cheap” lies in reshaping China’s position and pricing‑discourse power within global industrial chains. “For example, China Mineral Resources Group Co., Ltd., founded in 2022, acts as a central‑enterprise mineral platform integrating scattered domestic procurement requirements and creating the advantage of ‘leveraging purchase volume to set prices’. Meanwhile, expanded diversified import channels and sufficient strategic stockpiles have given China the leverage to say ‘no’ to unreasonable pricing. The rise of the futures market has further strengthened its bargaining power in the contest for pricing rights. By the end of 2024, the RMB‑denominated trading volume of iron‑ore futures on the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE) had accounted for around 30 % of the global total of iron‑ore futures transactions, becoming one of the important references for global iron‑ore pricing. Chinese enterprises are also actively expanding overseas equity‑mine layouts. Take the China‑invested Simandou iron‑ore mine in Guinea: its production capacity will hit 120 million tons per year in 2026, equivalent to 10 % of China’s annual iron‑ore imports, delivering vital safeguards for stable domestic iron‑resource supply.” More importantly, according to Jiang Yaodong, China realizes value‑chain upgrading through industrial transformation. As “Made in China” evolves toward “Smart‑Manufactured in China”, high‑value‑added products such as high‑speed‑rail equipment, new‑energy facilities, advanced chips and aerospace gear are gradually replacing exports of raw primary materials. This breaks the vicious cycle of “relying on imported resources while exporting low‑priced manufactured goods”, fundamentally lifting China’s bargaining position in global mineral trade.

When it comes to strategic resolve, Jiang Yaodong argued that the foundation of all these breakthrough‑oriented actions lies in the Party Central Committee’s strategic perseverance and institutional strengths of “keeping up the work from one generation to the next”. “General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out the direction for mineral‑resource‑security work in the new era. Mineral‑resource security is a matter of national importance bearing on overall development. Accordingly, the 14th Five‑Year Plan for Raw‑Materials‑Industry Development systematically lays out pathways centering on strengthening ‘resource‑guarantee capacity, industrial‑foundation capacity and intrinsic‑safety capacity’, ensuring the scientific and forward‑looking advancement of resource‑security work,” Jiang Yaodong shared his insights. Under the centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee, strong synergies have been forged between central and local governments, governments and enterprises, as well as research institutions and market operators. In the R&D of deep‑sea mining equipment, for example, China successfully developed deep‑sea mining vehicles with independent intellectual‑property rights within just a few years and completed multiple trial‑mining operations in the South China Sea with promising results.

“Mineral‑resource security bears not only on industrial development, but also underpins the national confidence for great‑power competition and the foundation for national rejuvenation. Only by firmly holding the ‘rice bowl’ of resource security can we prop up the ‘backbone’ of great‑power manufacturing and accumulate development momentum amid international competition. This suspension of US‑dollar‑denominated iron‑ore procurement demonstrates that China is no longer a passive acceptor within the international mineral market. Instead, it is becoming a leader who actively shapes rules and participates in pricing. A more independent, resilient and influential Chinese resource‑security system is taking shape at an accelerated pace.” Jiang Yaodong expressed great expectations for the future.